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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of price restrictions in personal
services contracts for direct health care providers. This is a unique method of contracting
designed specifically to facilitate the hiring of highly specialized health care providers,
primarily physicians, that typically demand a higher rate of compensation than that
generally offered by the services.
Legislation that authorized increased use of such contracts for health care services
simultaneously mandated wage ceilings. Some economic impacts of wage ceilings in labor
markets are presented. Shortages and/or possible quality problems are likely to be
associated with wage ceilings. Recent data concerning personal services contracts are
presented and examined. The result of the data evaluation provides some surprises. First,
many personal services contracts are not being utilized as originally intended. In fact very
few are actually used for physicians' services. Second, there is an appearance of
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Since 1986 the Department of Defense has used personal
services contracts for direct health care providers when in-
house sources of providers were insufficient to support the
medical mission of the military departments. While the
ambiguity of the medical mission tends to blur the focus of
any policy review of these unique contracts, this thesis
examines some economic ramifications of personal services
contracts.
Personal services contracts are unusual and should not be
confused with other types of service contracts. Specific
authority for these contracts is contained in Title 10, of the
United States Code.
Personal services contracts enable the Navy to contract
with groups or individuals to provide services at military
medical treatment facilities. These contracts make the
contractor appear, and perform, essentially as a government
employee. Other service contracts do not have this same
employee-employer relationship. The rationale for personal
services contracts is described later in this chapter.
Personal services contracts were originally meant to
support the medical mission by maximizing beneficiary access
1
to Military Medical Treatment Facilities, maintaining
readiness, reducing the use of the Civilian Health and Medical
Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), and enhancing the
quality of care by promoting the continuity of
patient/provider relationships. The Navy currently appears to
have somewhat ambiguous and ill defined goals with respect to
the medical mission. A more well defined, measurable, and
direct mission for the military medical department could
possibly reduce the requirement for these types of contracts.
(See the discussion in Melese [1990] for example.)
This chapter will examine federal contracting-policy, the
origins of the legislation which allow for personal services
contracts, and the Contracting Officer's responsibility in
overseeing personal service contracts. The chapter will also
describe general provisions of service contracts and personal
services contracts as prescribed by part 37 of the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (F_ R). An emphasis is placed on
differentiating between personal and nonpersonal service
contracts. Idiosyncracies specific to personal direct health
care services are discussed. Finally, this chapter includes
a brief description of a new alternative, namely Nonpersona!
services contracts for direct health care providers.
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B. FEDERAL POLICY
The policy of the federal government is to rely on the
private sector for common commercial services.' This r of
course, does not include performance of inherently
governmental functions, nor does it -eauire contracts for
functions where government performance is practicable and more
cost effective.
Under general contracting authority, nonpersonal services
contracts are appropriate. Examples of nonpersonal services
contracts include housekeeping services, grounds maintenance,
security services, food service, or any other common
commercial service that would not require the government to
directly supervise the contract employee. In contrast,
personal services contracts reauire a specific authorization
and are not awarded unless that authorization is granted.
Current1- the Department of Defense FAR Supplement
contains guidance for two types of personal services which can
be obtained by contract. 2
-The Office of 1anagement and Budget (0-S) reaffirmed
Federal policy concerning commercial activities when 01
Circular A-76 was signed in 1983. The policy stresses
competition between the government a-.d the private sector-
2 T'he Federal Acquisition Regulation prohibits Personal
ser-ices contracts. The only exceptions are for the services
of "individual experts or consultants" and "direct health care
providers".
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1. Origin of Legislation
The Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1984,
provided the authority for increased use of contract health
care providers. A new section was added to chapter 55 of
title 10, United States Code. This new section, sec. 1091,
authorized the Secretary of Defense to contract with persons
for services, including personal services, for the provision
of direct health care services. In addition this section
restricts the rate of compensation the Secretary can pay for
these contracts. This rate may not exceed the rate of basic
pay and allowances authorized by Chapters 3 and 7 of Title 37
for a commissioned officer in pay grade O-6 with 26 or more
years of service. This wage restriction operates as a price
ceiling. The economic effect of a binding wage ceiling in the
labor market is for less labor to be supplied than is desired
at the restricted wage. This excess of demand over supply
typically results in labor shortages. This effect will be
considered in Chapter II.
The section (1091) also repealed-two sections of Title
10. Sections 4022 and 9022 provided the Army and Air Force
authority to enter into contracts with civilian physicians to
provide non-personal services in military medical treatment
facilities. These sections were originally intended to help
those services during times of emergency. However
compensation offered in these non-personal service contracts
was very low. For example, the maximum pay rate for a
4
contract physician under these sections was limited to the pay
of an Army or Air Force captain with over four but less than
six years of service. Needless to say, these sections were so
restrictive that they went unused.
The original language which set the current
compensation restrictions was contained in a Senate Report
from the Committee on Armed Services. Mr. Tower's committee
recommended a provision requested by the Defense Department
which resulted in the new section in Title 10.
The committee was very concerned about the Services'
ability to acquire the personal services of physicians, noting
that only a few types of health services, such as radiology
and pathology, are subject to procurement by non-personal
services contracts. But, interestingly, relatively few of
today's personal services contracts for direct health care
providers are for physicians.
Another major concern of the committee was the issue
of adequate compensation. The provision recommended by the
committee would,
"make the salary of a contract health care provider
negotiable depending upon the skills of the individual and
the needs of the military services for those skills up to
the sum of the basic pay, basic allowance for subsistence,
and the basic allowance for quarters of an 0-6 with over
26 years of service. In implementing this provision, the
Committee expects the maximum allowable Salary to be used
sparingly."
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2. Contracting Officer Responsibilities
The Contracting Officer is responsible for ensuring
that a proposed contract for services is proper. To do this
he must determine if the contract is for personal or
nonpersonal services. If necessary, he should have the
contract reviewed by the office of Counsel. If he determines
that the appropriate contract is for personal services he must
keep the file well documented to support his determination.
This documentation may include the concurring opinion of legal
counsel, letters or memos containing facts and rationale in
support of -his determination, and any other additional
documentation the contracting agency may require.
C. CONTRACT TYPES
1. Service Contracts
General policy and procedures for the procurement of
services by contract are prescribed in part 37 of the Federal
Auisition Regulation. The FAR distinguishes between
contracts for personal services and contracts for nonpersonal
services.
A "Service Contract" is a contract that directly
engages the time and effort of a contractor whose primary
purpose is to perform an identifiable task rather than to
furnish an end item of supply. Service contracts can be one
of two types. First, the "Personal Services Contract" is a
contract that, by it's express terms or as administered, makes
6
contractor personnel appear, in effect, as government
employees. Second, the "Nonpersonal Services Contract" is a
contract under which the personnel rendering the services are
not subject, either by the contract's terms or by-the manner
of it's administration, to the supervision and control usually
prevailing in the relationships between the government and
it's employees.
2. Personal Services Contracts
The government is normally required to obtain its
employees by direct hire under competitive appointment or
other procedures required by the civil service laws. As
indicated in the FAR, a personal services contract is
characterized by the employer-employee relationship it creates
between the government and the contractor's personnel.
Personal services contracts circumvent the civil service laws
unless Congress has specifically authorized acquisition of the
services by contract.
The characteristic employer-employee relationship
occurs when the contractor's personnel are subject to
relatively continuous supervision of a government officer or
employee. This can result from either the terms of the
contract as written or by the manner of its administration
during performance. Ordering a specific article or service
and reserving the right to reject the finished product or
result, is not the type of supervision that converts a
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contractor employee into a government employee. The
determining factor is normally whether the government will
exercise relatively continuous supervision and -ontrol over
contractor personnel. Every proposed arrangement must be
eva ated in light of its own facts and circumstances. It is
advised to seek and document the opinion of legal counsel to
support the contracting officer's final decision.
a. Assessing Contract Type
When making an assessment as to whether a contract
for services is for personal or nonpersonal services, some
basic descriptive elements should be used as a guide. The FAR
provides a list of key elements which would tend to make the
appropriate contract a personal services contract.
Performance on site is characteristic of personal services
contracts. Also, if the principle tools and equipment are
provided by the government in the course of contract
performance, a personal services contract is generally
appropriate. Moreover, if (1) the services provided are
applied directly to the integral effort of the agency in
furtherance of its assigned mission, or if (2) comparable
services, meeting the same type needs, are performed in the
same agency using military or civil service personnel, a
determination of the appropriateness of a personal services-
contract is likely. Another key element is the length of time
the service will be needed. Personal services tend to be
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required for periods in excess of one year. Finally, the
question of government direction or supervision applies.
Personal services contracts, by their inherent nature or by
the manner provided, reasonably require direct or indirect
government direction or supervision of contractor personnel.
3. Personal Direct Health Care Services
In part 237 (Service Contracting) of the DOD FAR
Supplement, under subpart 237.1 (Service Contracts), there is
a section 237.104 devoted to Personal Services Contracts.
Under this section, subsection S-71 deals with acquisition of
Personal Direct Health Care services. It sets policy and
procedures for the acquisition by contract of the personal
direct health care services from individuals or firms.
a. Definition
Direct health care services are those services
provided by health care providers who participate in clinical
patient care services. Examples would be Doctors, Nurses,
Dentists, and various Therapists, Technologists, and
Technicians. Not included are services provided by
predominantly administrative or clerical personnel and
personnel who provide maintenance or security services.
b. Justification
In the course of accomplishing the-medical mission
at major Military Medical Treatment Facilities, shortfalls in
critical personnel areas are often observed. (Maze and
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Longo,1989) These shortfalls can have pronounced effects in
beneficiary access to military health care, causing increased
use of CHAMPUS for our military dependant population, -(Willis,
1989 and Navy Times, 1989) Also, these critical shortages can
significantly damage our Graduate Medical Education Program.
(1) Graduate Medical Education. The Graduate
Medical Education Program is considered an important component
of medical readiness since it provides one way of retaining
the-best physicians possible. Few recognize that one of the
strongest retainers of physicians in military medicine is the
Graduate Medical Education Program. The military trains its
own Physicians in their specialties. This advanced education
includes four to five year residency training programs for
these physicians, depending upon- the specialty. The
opportunity to have a Medical Residency in one of these
programs keeps good doctors- in the military by attaching a
service requirement to the training. Military physicians
compete for the limited number of residencies awarded each
year. Once accepted to a program, the physician must then
commit himself to serve on active dut4 for a specified- period
of time after completion of the residency 5 aining program.
Graduate Medical Educat-¢n Programs are not
inexpensive and require appropriate accreditation. For this
accreditation the institution must be able to provide the wide
range of clinical expertise necessary to support a complete
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program. In other words, if a medical facility wants to
provide a particular residency training program (i.e. an
orthopaedic residency), they may be required to have the
expertise of some very specific mec4.tr specialists (i.e. an
orthopaedic oncologist) on hand .. E facility.3  These
highly specialized physicians are .eeded not only for
consultation, but also to ensure that , "!ide enough" spectrum
of patients is experienced by the p.. .ian kn residency.
The scarcity of these highly specialized
individuals (and thus the high wages they command) often leads
to ihortages. At times, the only recourse available for these
critical personnel shortfalls is the personal services
contract for direct health care providers.
(2) Examples. The Naval Hospital at San Diego,
in order to retain it's Thoracic Surgery Residency training
program, required the services of a Perfusionist - a specially
trained Registered Nurse who is responsible for operating the
machines which circulate and oxygenate a patient's blood
during open heart surgery. There are no Navy billets for a
nurse perfusionist and the Naval Hospital has no civil service
3This is somewhat analogous to a "Union Shop". One might
argue there is an analogy to a railroad union's demand for a
brakeman on every train, even though technology has surpassed
the requirement. It would seem logical to contract for a
single doctor's visit when the patient's clinical condition
warranted it, rather than to contract for even a part time
physician whose services are only required as an input to
produce physicians which satisfy the American Medical
Association.
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positions available for one. Yet the requirement is deemed
critical to the mission of the Naval Hospital in San Diego.
This job, if performed by a contractor, by its
inherent nature, requires constant, direct supervisioni of the
contractor by a government employee, namely the surgeon. The
need for the perfusionist's services is expected to 1 st
-beyond one _ear and the performance of the service is on site.
Each of these characteristics support a determ;ration of
"personal services" by the contracting officer.
Another case, not quite as obvious in its
determination, required part time services of -a pediatric
endocrinologist -to ensure accreditation of the Pediatric
Residency Training Program. One might argue that pediatrics
is not essential to the military mission, but without a viable
Pediatric Residency Prograrr both the General Surgery and
Internal Medicine Residency Programs might lose
accreditation.4 Also, by gaining these services in-house, the
Navy satisfies another apparent objective, namely reducing its
use of CKAMPUS. The key elements in the determination of
personal services in this case include the extent to which the
government directs the contractor and retains control of the
function involved. This case required the contractor to be
answerable to the Chief of Pediatric Services for contract
4Another possible example of the "union shop" at work.
12
performance, and thus also satisfied the criteria for a
personal services contract.
c. Limitations
Care must be taken by the Contracting Officer to
ensure that the acquisition of services by contract are in
support of the medical mission and are meeting needs beyond
the capabilities of in-house resources. In other words, the
requirement must be greater than the capabilities of the
Military Medical Treatment Facility when it is fully staffed.
Contracts cannot be awarded to fill vacant civil service
positions for example. Similarly. gapped military billets can
not be filled with contractor personnel under personal
services contracts.
There are some other limitations to personal
services contracts for direct health care providers. As with
other personal services contracts, preference shall not be
given to former government employees. Moreover, prospective
personal services contracts for direct health care providers
must be approved in accordance with the department's own
approval requirements.
d. Compensation
Compensation of contract health care providers is
negotiable depending upon the skills of the prospective
contractor. The government retains full personal
responsibility for the function involved, therefore the
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contractor is not required to furnish malpractice liability
insurance. This can be a considerable factor when determining
the contract price. In particular, the contractor can
potentially gain a substantial savings by not having to
furnish malpractice insurance.
Interestingly, this assumption of the risk on the
government's part amounts to non-wage compensation provided to
the contract health care provider. The actual amount of this
indirect compensation varies with the contractor. Notably,
health care providers with the highest malpractice insurance
rates in effect receive the greatest overall compensation
working for the military. Thus one might argue that less-
talented, more risk prone health Care providers would find it
more attractive to contract with the military.
It has been previously stated that wage
compensation is limited using the military pay scale as a
guide. For instance, a personal services contract for one
full time equivalent (FTE) 5 of a doctor can be priced up to
the total earnings of a Navy Captain with over 26 years in
service. Compensation rate includes basic pay, basic
allowance for quarters, variable housing allowance, and basic
allowance for subsistence. It does not include special or
5One FTE (full time equivalent) is equal to the amount of
work one would expect from a single, full time, employee.
Full time for this purpose is 40 hours per week. A contract
may be let for some amount less than one FTE, for example, 0.1
FTE would equate to a part time .mployee, or 4 hours per week.
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incentive pays, hazardous duty pay, flight pay, professional
pay, continuation pay, or any discretionary pay. Compensation
must be within the limits of Table I on the following page.
TABLE I MAXIMUM AUTHORIZED COMPENSATION RATES
Occupation/Specialty Group Compensation Rate Not to Exceed*
Pay Grade Years of Service
Physicians and Dentists 0-6 over 26
Other individuals, 0-5 over 20





All registered nurses, 0-4 over 16
except those included in but less than 18
group II
Paraprofessionals 0-3 over 6
but less than 8
4. Nonpersonal Health Care Services
The FAR contains subpart 37.4 - Nonpersonal Health
Care Services. The subpart prescribes policy and procedures
for- obtaining direct patient care services under the
previously mentioned nonpersonal services contract. This
contract type is discussed to provide a contrast with the
personal services contract. The outcome of a nonpersonal
service contract is similar, but the government does not
exercise as much control over the contractor. Under these
nonpersonal services contracts for direct health care
15
providers the government may evaluate the quality of
professional and administrative services provided, but retains
no control over the professional medical aspects of services
rendered.
These contracts can be used in instances like the
Primus Clinics and Navcare Clinic. The mission need in these
instances is simply to increase access to the military medical
system for eligible beneficiaries and reduce CHAMIPUS costs.
In contrast to the case of personal services
contracts, under nonpersonal services contracts, the
contractor is required to seek his own insurance for
malpractice. In such contracts for direct health care
providers, the Contracting Officer must obtain evidence of
insurability prior to the award of the contract and ensure
that a Government indemnification clause is included in the
contract.
D. CHAPTER SUMARY
The justification for personal services contracts is
captured -t phrases such as "maximize beneficiary access" and
"facilitate mission accomplishment." The ambiguity of the
military medical mission may in itself create an artificial
requirement for contract health care providers.
Various methods are available to obtain the health care
services required to accomplish the stated medical mission.
Both the Federal Acquisition Regulation and the Department of
16
Defense nNR Supplement recognize and address the unique needs
o0z medical department!. in procurement of services. The most
important aspect of the process is the Contracting Officer's
assessment. 7herefore the terms of the proposed contract and
the mancer of e=. cution must support the method used. To
ensure th., most for their money, the activities desiring the
execution cf p-ersonal services contracts in their facilities
must work C! 'cely with the Contracting Officer to help
determine the cpt zum contracting method and help to monitor
the terms of the cntract after the award is sranted.
Higher risk health care providers , one would argue, would
find it more attractive to contract with the military than
their less risk prone counterparts. This is due to the
government's assumption of risk in personal services contracts
which amounts to non-wacre compensation provided to the
contract health care prorider. Other things equal, health
care providers with the highest malpractice insurance rates in
effect receive the greatest overall compensation working foor
the military. Thus, on the margin, the military may be
enticing more physicians with higher malpractice insurance
rates to contract their services to the militaryr.
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II. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
A. THE MARKET FOR HEALTH CARE SERVICES
1. Supply of Health Care Services
The supply of any given health care service (for
example physician's services) is determined by a variety of
inputs. In the long run, changes in the actual number of
individuals practicing in a given health care profession can
effect the supply of labor in the market. For example, more
medical school graduates and/or more medical schools, would
each have the effect of increasing available supply.
In the short run, however, the supply of labor is
affected most by changes in the real wage rate. A higher real
wage encourages individuals to offer more of their labor
services than a lower real wage rate (ceteris paribus). Each
individual's labor supply curve is thus typically upward
sloping6 and the sum of these individual supply curves make
up the market supply of labor curve. (Nicholson, 1987) Thus
the supply of labor in a given market (for nurses, physicians,
'Marshall .(1938) cites a case of a regressive or backward
sloping supply curve which is based on the assumption that
once income has° reached some given level, the desire for
leisure prevails over the desire for income, so that at very
high levels of wages, less effort will be exerted than at
lower levels. This is viewed here as the exception rather
than t-.e rule.
dentists, etc.) will tend to slope up and to the right as in
Figure 1.
2. Demand for Health Care Services
Health care services are inputs to the provision of
health care and are demanded in a wide range of settings.
Public health services, education, non-profit organizations,
the media, the military, and the health care industry to name
a few.
To study the demand for these inputs, and how that
demand might change with wage changes, one needs to look at
the marginal revenue product of labor (MRPL)
MRP L :- MPL ' M
The marginal revenue product of labor (MRPL) is the
product of the marginal physical productivity of labor (MPL)
and marginal revenue (MR). The marginal physical product o
labor is the additional output that one more employee can
generate for an employer. In the case of health care services
this may measure, for example, how many additional surgical
procedures a physician can perform. Once this output measure
has been generated, the revenue produced by an additional unit
of output is measured and multiplied by the MPL to yield the
marginal revenue product of labor. A profit-maximizing
employer would tend to hire labor services at the point where
MRPL = W. If MRPL > W then the employer can still profit by
19
hiring more labor (and thus providing more health services)
since the last unit of labor increases earnings (MRPL) by more
than that labor requires to work for the employer -(W).
Alternatively, if MRPL < W, then the employer lost money on
the last unit of labor hired. Thus employers "demand" labor






Figure 1 Market for Health Care Services
As a result of the diminishing marginal revenue
product7 associated with each additional input, and the
willingness of employers to pay a wage, W = MRPL, demand
7For example, a hospital that has only four operating
room suites will probably not gain as much revenue from hiring
their fifth surgeon as they gained by hiring their fourth.
And if they do hire the fifth surgeon, his marginal revenue
product would be greater than a sixth surgeon, etc.
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curves for health care providers tend to slope down. At
higher wage rates less will be demanded than at lower wage
rates (ceteris paribus).
Thus the demand for health care services will
typically slope down and to the right as in Figure 1. Note
that, on the one hand, if people live healthier lifestyles,
this will tend to shift D to the left, while, on the other
hand, an epidemic might tend to shift D to the right.
3. Interaction of Supply and Demand
a. Equilibrium
The equilibrium level of wages (W*) is determined
at the intersection of the supply and demand curves (Point E
in Figure 1). This is the wage at which health care providers
will make just enough of their services available (L) to
satisfy existing demand at that wage. The equilibrium wage
will vary with geographic region as well as with occupation.
Note further that the real wage can be made up of both
pecuniary and non-pecuniary elements.
b. Disequilibrium
(1) Wages Set Above Equilibrium. An example
would be a minimum wage. If a union such as the American
Medical Association were able to get congressional approval
for a minimum wage for physicians that would be above the
equilibrium wage, the market would experience a surplus of







Figure 2 The Impact of Wage Ceilings
(2) Wages Set Below Equilibrium. On the other
hand, when a wage ceiling is imposed, and the wage ceiling is
binding, or in other words below the equilibrium level of
wages, the market will experience shortages (or excess
demand). This latter case can be seen in Figure 2. As shown,
the wage ceiling is imposed at W, but che equilibrium wage is
at W*. Market demand for labor services at wage W is L1. The
market supply at that wage is t0. The result is a shortage of
labor equal to L0 - L1 .
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B. MILITARY INTERACTION WITH THE MARKET
The military tends to be a "price taker" in the market for
health care services, since it is a relatively small demander
in each market. Therefore it cannot generally influence the
market wage, but it can hire as many health care providers as
it requires if it offers the market wage. Also, it is assumed
here that "military requirements" result in perfectly
inelastic demand in the short run. With the imposition of
wage ceilings, there can be some ramifications that are not
immediately apparent. The figures on the following pages
provide some insight to the military's interaction with the
various markets for health care services. In Figures 3, 4,
and 5, the graph on the right-hand-side represents the
military's problem, while the graph(s) on the left represent
the market(s) from which the military must hire labor
services. For example, in Figure 3, L' refers to the
military's "requirement", while L* is the market equilibrium
level of health care services of a certain type available at
the wage W*.
1. A Non-Binding Wage Ceiling (i.e. a wage ceiling above
the equilibrium wage)
With a wage ceiling (W') above the equilibrium (W*),
as in Figure 3, the military will overcompensate health care







Figure 3 Equilibrium Below Wage Ceiling
Wage Ceiling W' > W* (equilibrium)
With the equilibrium at a real wage rate (W*), a wage
ceiling at W', results- in overpayment for the required health
care services. As shown, the military's demand (D') for the
(required) quantity of service (LY) would result in a contract
payment W'L' > W*L'.
2. A Binding Wage Ceiling (i.e. a wage ceiling below the
equilibrium wage)
When the market equilibrium wage (W**) is above the
wage ceiling (W'), the military will be unable to hire it's
required health care providers at the ceiling price. Figure




Figure 4 Equilibrium Above the Ceiling Wage
Wage Ceiling W' < W** (equilibrium)
In this situation the military requirement results in
the inelastic demand of D'' for L'' units of health care
services. The equilibrium wage for the services would require
the military to pay a total of W**L '' for those services. The
price ceiling imposed at W' thus prevents the military from
obtaining the required services.
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There are only three options (or combinations thereof)
that would allow the military to hire health care providers
from markets where the equilibrium wage is greater than the
wage ceiling (or where the wage ceiling is binding):
1. A waiver - in some circumstances a waiver has been issued
to allow the wage ceiling to be exceeded,
2. Various non-wage compensation benefits can make up for
restrictions in wages8, or
3. Quality suffers, as shown in Figure 5.
Referring to Figure 5, the military requirement for a
particular health care provider again results in an inelastic
demand (D'') for L'' units of labor over the given time frame.
The market equilibrium for this particular health care
provider will dictate a real wage rate of W**, but the wage
ceiling has been imposed at a lower level (W'). It could be
argued that a sub-market of health care providers exists as
indicated by the graph on the left-hand-side of Figvre 5.
This sub-market represent's supply and demand for less
experienced, or otherwise lower qualified labor services and
therefor results in a lower equilibrium wage at W***. This
smaller market could end up being the one providing- services
to the military. Other factors that could place individuals
8For example, If an individual health care provider
places a relatively high value on the fact that he is not
required to insure himself while working under contract with
the government, then he may feel that this non-wage
compensation makes up the difference between the wage ceiling




Figure 5 A Lower Quality Market
in this sub-market include language problems (new immigrant
doctors), a history of higher incidents of malpractice, etc.
The point is that this sub-market is likely to be made up of
lower quality-health care providers. Note that resolving the
problem of a binding wage ceiling with a waiver, as in the
first option, is the superior option since it reveals the true
cost of the hired services and thus allows managers the
opportunity to decide whether these services are truly
required. On the other hand, the third option, reduced
quality, is probably the worst of the lot since it is
difficult to measure the quality of health care, any quality
problems are insidious for managers and potentially far more
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The Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1984
includes a section entitled "Authority for increased usage of
contract health care providers". This section specifically
addressed the shortcomings of the then current law9 as
follows:
Under current law, civilian physicians may be contracted
to provide non-personal services in military medical
treatment facilities, The authority to award these
contracts exists for the Army and the Air Force, but not
for the Navy. The maximum rate of pay for a contract
surgeon is limited to the pay of an Army or Air Force
captain with over four years of service.
The House amendment of 1984, which was the first step
toward the law allowing personal services contracts for direct
health care providers, attempted to address the problem of
physician shortages in the armed forces. The representatives
in the House called the shortages "serious" and specifying
"those specialties that command very high salaries in the
private sector." The House amendment went on to describe the
need for personal services contracts for physicians, stating
that:
9Two laws existed that permitted the contracting of
physicians' nonpersonal services. One for the Army and the
other for the Air Force.
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Only a few types of health services, such as radiology and
pathology, can be procured by nonpersonal services
contracts. Most physician services require some type of
direct involvement with the other personnel in the
military medical treatment facility and would thus
constitute a personal service contact.
The subsequent legislative action, section 1091, Title 10
of the United States Code, was apparently intended to enable
the mi-itary to enter into personal services contracts wit+i
ohysicians. More specifically, with those physician
specialists who command high salaries (Higher than an Army or
Air Force Captain with over four years of service) and are
therefore in short supply. (See Chapter II for a discussion
of the effects of binding price ceilings.) Moreover, this
action was aimed at physicians for whom contract methods did
not already exist. As indicated in the previous quote, the
legislature understood that pathologists and radiologists, for
instance, would not need to be hired with personal services
contracts since they could be hired with existing nonpersonal
services contracts.
However, the resulting public law, contained in Title 10,
of the United States Code, includes ambiguous terminology that
allows the Defense Department to contract for personal and
nonpersonal services to provide direct health care service as
it determines is required. This language opened the dtor to
all health care providers (physicians and non-physicians
alike) to compete for government contracts.
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B. ONGOING PERSONAL SERVICES CONTRACTS
On September 10, 1990 the Navy was engaged in 221 personal
services contracts for direct health care providers. These
221 contracts amounted to 544 full time ecuivalent contractor
employees (FTE's) . Surprisingly, of those 544 FTE's, only 17
of these were for physicians. Moreover, of those 17 full time
equivalent physicians, four FTE's were for the services of
radiologists or pathologists. So only 13, or about 2.4
percent, of the 544 FTE's the Navy is currently procuring by
contract, are for services of physicians that are among the
type for which the legislation was originally written. The
total monthly bill for these contracts is over $2.2 million.
The breakdown of health care providers currently under
contract, by profession, appears in the following table:
TABLE II CURREN.E PERSOnAL SERVICES CONTRACTS
Profession Grouo Contracts FTE's
Physicians T 15 17
Dentists i 68 67.5
Other professionals IT 18 35.3
Registered Nurses T 17 286.6
Dental Hvgienists IV 86 82.6
Other paraprofessionals IV 17 55
Totals: 221 544
Appendix A contains a full list of the 221 contracts by
location with price and contract duration indicated.
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1. Physicians
As indicated in Table II, only 15 personal servicea
contracts exist for physicians. The list is contained as
Table III on the following page.
These 15 contracts total 17 full time equivalent
physicians. Interestingly, four of the 17 FTE's are for
radiologists and pathologists, specialties previously thought
obtainable through nonpersonal services contract.
Furthermore, of the specialties listed, one might argue that
few are among "those specialties that command very high
salaries in the private sector," as the Representatives in the
House described the need for these personal services
contracts. For example, general medical officers (GMO) and
Pediatricians are not among the physicians on the higher end
of the pay scale.10  The table also contains information
about the price of the contracts currently operating. This
will be discussed in the following section.
Table III indicates the various physician specialists
with whom the Navy now contracts. The first column,
"Specialty", indicates the medical specialty. The column
marked "FTE" shows the number of full time equivalent
employees contracted. "Months" is the contract duration in
1 The American Medical Association (1988) reports that the
average net income after expenses and before taxes for a self-
employed physician is $146,200.00. General practitioners
(GMO's) earn $96,900 annually and Pediatricians make
$96,500.00 per year.
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TABLE III LIST OF PERSONAL SERVICES CONTRACTS FOR PHYSICIANS
Specialty FTE Months Price Authorized Difference
GMO 0.5 12 $7,045 $37,979 $30,934
GMO 1 6 $29,120 $35,286 $6,166
GYN 1 9 $52,754 $57,837 $5,083
HIV Internist 2 12 $223,255 $149,337 ($73,918)
Neuro Radiologist 1 12 $259,770 $74,669 ($185,101)
OB/GYN 1 12 $30,600 $76,345 $45,745
OB/GYN 1 12 $73,500 $76,345 $2,845
OB/GYN 3 12 $500,000 $215,119 ($284,881)
Pathologist 1 12 $229,480 $71,706 ($157,774)
Pathologist 1 12 $242,000 $71,269 ($170,731)
Ped Endocrinologist 0.5 12 $25,000 $38,172 $13,172
Pediatrician 1 12 $71,923 $77,116 $5,193
Physiologist 1 5 $15,600 $31,810 $16,210
Psychologist 1 12 $64,980 $71,269 $6,289
Radiologist 1 12 $114,000 $74,669 ($39,331)
months. And "Price" indicates the contract price. The column
marked "Authorized" shows the maximum authorized
compensation' for each contract based on location, number of
FTE's, and duration. The "Difference" column displays the
amount that the contract was (over) or under the maximum
authorized compensation rate.
2. Dentists and Dental Hygienists
Almost 70 percent of the total number of personal
services contracts are related to dental services. Dentists
and dental hygienists, acquired by contract, number 150.1
"Maximum authorized compensation equates to a wage
ceiling as discussed in Chapter II, this wage ceiling may or
may not be binding.
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full time equivalents. That is more that one fourth of the
current total number of FTE's.
However, historically, the Navy Dental Corps has not
experienced difficulty retaining good dentists and dental
technicians. No mention of shortfalls in the dental community
can be found in any discussions leading to Section 1091 of
Title 10, United States Code. Why then has the dental
community embraced this route of personnel acquisition so
readily?
One might speculate that the dental community is
taking full advantage of monies appropriated for personal
services contracts since the price ceiling (of roughly
$74,000.00/year) imposed by Congress is not binding in the
market for dentists and dental hygienists. The market rate of
wages for dentists and dental hygienists is well below the
price ceiling imposed by Congress. This is shown in Figure 6,
and corresponds to section B.1 of Chapter II, the discussion
of a binding wage ceiling.
Moreover, it has been suggested that the actual market
demand for dentists has been steadily decreasing as a result
of better oral hygiene (Hawes, 1988). Thus, even a current
fixed annual wage (W* < $74K), which results from a contract
may be higher than the new equilibrium wage (W** < W*). The
effect of decreasing market demand (ceteris paribus)
necessarily causes the equilibrium to move down the supply





Figure 6 Market for Dentists
department can augment it's personnel pool by exploiting an
implicit equality provided in the directives governing
personal services contracts between dentists and physicians.
Unfortunately, this treatment of dentists equal to physicians
within the Navy Medical Department appears to deviate from the
original purpose of the legislation which was targeted at
physicians.
3. Registered Nurses
Over 50 percent of the FTE's are contained in a
relatively few contracts for registered nurses. One would
assume that the nature of the nursing profession lends itself
to employment by some fairly standard statements of work.
This would allow a large number of individuals to be hired
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with alternative contracts. Thus using personal services
contracts for this type of labor contracting, although abiding
by the letter of the law, does not seem consistent with the
intention of the law. Again, personal services contracts were
originally intended to obtain the services of unique, highly
specialized individuals.
4. Other Professionals and Paraprofessionals
About 16 percent of the contracts and a comparable
portion of the full time equivalent contract employees fall
into the areas of other professionals and parapi fessionals.
The former of these two groups contain healthcare providers
with degrees such as pharmacists, optometrists, psychologists,
and specially trained registered nurses (nurse practitioners,
anesthetists, and perfusionists). The paraprofessionals group
consists of various technicians who may or may not have, or
require, degrees or licenses for the performance of their
duties under the contract. Examples of this final group would
include pharmacy, laboratory, and X-ray technicians.
The rationale in contracting these personnel in most
instances has little to do with the design of the original
legislation. In most cases, the service is procured by
personal services contract because the civil service pay scale
is inadequate to compensate these professionals in high cost
geographic regions. Thus instead of curtailing services or
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reducing productivity, the service is procured through
personal services contracts.
C. COMPENSATION IN PERSONAL SERVICES CONTRACTS
Table I contains the basic breakdown of authorized
compensation rates for personal services contracts for direct
health care providers. The maximum rate for physicians and
dentists is the sum of all basic pay and allowances of an
officer in the pay grade of a Navy Captain, or Colonel of the
other armed services, including the variable housing allowance
(VHA). As a result of VHA, there is a slight difference in the
maximum compensation allowed in different locations.
The contents of Table I (Chapter I), which indicates
maximum authorized wages for given specialties and
occupations, were issued by the Department of Defense. In
fact, the Law (sec. 1091, Title 10, United States Code) only
restricted contractor compensation rates under personal
services contracts to "the rate of basic pay and allowances
authorized...for a commissioned officer in pay grade 0-6 with
26 or more years of service". But the Department of Defense
went further in restricting contractor compensation rates when
original directives governing personal services contracts for
direct health care providers were issued.
These restrictions were directed by the Department of
Defense through DOD Instruction 6025.5 of February 27, 1985
and the DOD FAR Supplement of 1988. Although these are
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department of Defense directives, they do not carry the same
force of law as would, for example, the Federal Acquisition
Regulation or Title 10, of the United States Code.
Appendix B provides data on all currently engaged personal
services contracts for direct health care providers. It is
broken down by profession/occupation. It contains: contract
prices; authorized maximum compensation rates per month; total
maximum authorized compensation rates for the contract's
duration and location; and differences between total maximum
allowable rates and actual contract prices, for each contract.
This "Difference" column is either positive or negative. A
value appearing in parentheses indicates a negative value
which means that the contract price exceeded the maximum
allowable rate for that contract by the specified amount. A
positive value indicates that the contract price was less than
the maximum allowable rate for that contract, implying
possible savings (quality assumed constant)
1. Physicians
The average authorized compensation rate for existing
contracts for physicians is $6,164.52 per FTE12 per month or
about $74,000.00 per year. This is the weighted average of
the maximum payable rate based on the location, duration, and
number of full time equivalents. The weighted average of the
12Full time equivalent, as previously described in
foo -te 5 on page 14.
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actual contract price for these contracts is $10,314.00 per
FTE per month.'3
In some instances it has been necessary for the Navy
to exceed the authorized rates. (Note values in parentheses
in Table III) In these circumstances, waivers of the wage
ceiling (see Chapter II, section B.2) are requested when
equilibrium market wages prevent the Navy from hiring the
required health care provider(s). This has been the case in
six of the 15 personal services contracts for physicians.
Note that three of those contracts are at prices more than
three times the generally authorized amount, while another is
well over twice the legal mark. No contractors were willing
to work for the maximum authorized rate (or wage ceiling) in
each of these circumstances. Had a contractor been willing,
one would have to question the quality of service he would
deliver (see Chapter II, section 2.B).
a. Example
One contract has been awarded for three full time
equivalent obstetrician/gynecologists (OB/GYN) at a price of
$500,000.00 for 12 months. That is an average of $166,666.67
"A weighted average is used to keep the relative number
of full time equivalents in perspective. The weighted average
of the maximum payable rate is calculated by dividing the sum
of the products of the maximum monthly authorized rate
multiplied by the number of months duration of the contract
multiplied by the number of full time equivalents contracted
divided by the sum of the products of the number of months
duration of the contract multiplied by the number of full time
equivalents contracted.
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Aper physician per year. The maximum authorized rate is
$71,706.24 per physician per year in Orlando, Florida.14 The
average physician's net income (for OB/GYN) in that part of
the country is $162,400.00. The 25th percentile net income is
about $100,000.00 (after all expenses including liability
insurance) (AMA, 1988). No contractors were willing to provide
the services of three full time equivalent OB/GYN doctors for
the maximum allowable contract price of $215,118.72. Had a
contractor been willing to accept $215,118.72, he would be
receiving $90,693.76 less per physician than the average net
income for OB/GYN physicians or $28,297.76 less per physician
than the 25th percentile. To make up this difference, he
might consider his savings in liability insurance, but his
insurance rates would have to be significantly higher than the
average $35,300.00 paid by OB/GYN physicians each year.'5
One would hope that the Navy would not contract with a
physician who's professional liability insurance premiums were
more than $125,000.00 per year! But this does support our
earlier hypothesis that savings in liability insurance could
provide an incentive for less-competent physicians to seek
employment through government contracts. The wage ceiling is
binding for physicians.
"
4Recall that rates vary with location due to the variable
housing allowance component of total compensation.
"This argument is purely economic discourse and does not
emphasize other non-quantifiable, non-wage compensation that
a physician under contract with the military might realize.
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2. Dentists and Dental Hygienists
The average authorized compensation rate for the
existing contracts for dentists is $6,182.41 per FTE per
month, or about $74,000.00 per year. The slight difference
from the maximum wage of physician contracts is primarily
caused by differences in variable housing allowances.
However, the weighted average of the actual contract price for
dentist's contracts is $3,449.55 per FTE per month, much below
physician's actual contract price of $10,314.00 per FTE per
month, and significantly less than the maximum allowable. The
wage ceiling is not binding for dentists.
Dental hygienists under contract are paid an average
of $3,048.91, a figure fairly close to the maximum allowable
weighted average of $3,406.86. The average contract price for
dentists delivers an average annual salary of about
$41,400.00. The average dental hygienist under contract makes
about $36,600.00 per year. The wage ceiling is close to the
market equilibrium wage for dental hygienists.
3. Other Professionals
Again, these are health care providers with degrees
such as pharmacists, optometrists, psychologists, and
specially trained registered nurses (nurse practitioners,
anesthetists, and perfusionists). This is the only other
group who's weighted average monthly cost per FTE is less than
the Maximum allowable under the Department of Defense
41
directive. These contract employees average $4,083.33 per
month per FTE while their maximum allowable remuneration is
$5,253.44. The wage ceiling is generally not binding for this
group.
Most of the 18 different contracts for these
professionals have prices which hover around 75 - 80% of the
maximum allowable rate. Two of the three that exceed the
authorized level are for contracts involving less than a full
time equivalent. One contract is for a biweekly optometrist
in Barstow, California (0.1 FTE) and the other is for a weekly
pharmacist in Port Hueneme, California (0.2 FTE). These
contracts have a maximum allowable rate prorated to the
reduced time of contract performance. In other words, the
optometrist in Barstow has a maximum allowable compensation
rate of $485.78 per month. In order to secure a contract the
Navy had to exceed this prorated amount to make entering into
a government contract worth the contractor's while. The other
contract exceeding the authorized level is one for a Nurse
Practitioner in Great Lakes, Illinois. The maximum rate is
exceeded by less than five percent, but a waiver had to be
obtained.
4. Registered Nurses (EN)
There are currently 17 personal services contracts for
registered nurses. Nine of them are in Bethesda, Maryland;
five are in Oakland, California; two are being performed in
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Portsmouth, Virginia; and one is in San Diego, California.
All of the contracts in Bethesda and four of the five Oakland
contracts exceed the maximum allowable level. The other
Oakland contract is priced at about 85% of the maximum.
The weighted average price per month per FTE is
$4,737.06 when the maximum allowable level averages $4,448.56.
A difference of only $286.50, or about six percent over the
allowable level.
In Portsmouth the nursing contracts were let at much
less than the authorized maximum level. One of their
cuntracts is for 39 full time equivalent registered nurses and
the price is only $585,000.00 for the year. That translates
into a annual salary of about $15,000.00 for those registered
nurses. Meanwhile, for example, dental hygienists across the
bay in Norfolk, Virginia make an average annual salary of
$35,304.95 while engaged in personal services contracts with
the Navy. Something is obviously wrong with this situation.
Either RN's in Norfolk are willing to work for less than
market wages (in which case one must suspect quality), or the
data is pointing to a strange manipulation of contracts, or
the numbers are incorrect.
if one were to look at the other 16 nursing contracts,
removing the 39 FTE's of Portsmouth's questionable personal
services contract, one would find the negative gap widens
between the actual average price and the maximum authorized
compensation rate. A recalculation would result in a weighted
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average price of $5,284.00 per FTE per month compared to a
weighted average maximum rate (wage ceiling) of $4,481.53.
The contract in Portsmouth skews the data, reducing the
average price per FTE by more than ten percent. The wage
ceiling for RN's is more binding than it first appears.
5. Paraprofessionals
The average contract price among paraprofessionals is
well over the maximum authorized. There are two contracts
that one might argue skew the data. Both are in Bethesda,
Maryland. One is for one full time equivalent angiographer
compensated at a rate that would exceed any other medical
personal service contract the Navy now has. The reported
price for this one FTE contract is $309,950.00 per year. The
other contract is for seven full time equivalent respiratory
technicians at a rate of $68,776.43 per year each, for a total
of $481,435.00. Both of the occupations have a maximum
authorized rate of $41,928.48 per FTE per year. On these two
contracts alone the actual price paid exceeds the maximum
authorized by close to half a million dollars. Enough, it
seems, to be able to hire an additional 30 of those $15,000.00
a year registered nurses at Portsmouth.
Without these two contracts, the remaining personal
services contracts for paraprofessionals would have an average
price of $3,093.42 per FTE per month, well under the maximum
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rate of $3,415.39. The wage ceiling is generally not binding
for paraprofessionals, with two notable exceptions.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter examined the current law and DOD directives,
their rationale and their ramifications. Additionally, the
chapter described the existing Navy personal services
contracts for direct health care provides, breaking down the
list of ongoing contracts into professional/occupational
groups. The last half of the chapter examines average rates
of compensation in various ongoing contracts comparing these
rates to the maximum authorized by the Department of Defense.
Once again, the results are:
1) The wage ceiling is binding for physicians.
2) The wage ceiling is not binding for dentists.
3) The wage ceiling is generally not binding for "other
professionals".
4) The wage ceiling for Registered Nurses is more binding
than it at first appears.
5) The wage ceiling is generally not binding for
paraprofessionals, with two notable exceptions.
6) The wage ceiling is close to the market equilibrium for
dental hygienists.
Finally, several contracts are highlighted which appear




A. FEW CONTRACTS FOR THE ORIGINAL JUSTIFICATION
The rationale for personal services contracts is vague.
Very little guidance is given to indicate why the Navy should
procure these services by contract other than to increase
beneficiary access to military medical treatment facilities,
to reduce the burden on CHAMPUS, and to supply the Graduate
Medical Education program with the highly specialized
physician providers it requires. There iz no mistaking the
intended target of these contracts however. It is obvious
from the language employed by the legislature, that personal
services contracts for direct health care providers are
intended to obtain the services of highly specialized
physicians.
One would argue that the ambiguity of the law and current
directives have invited many unintended, but legal,
interpretations. Too few of the existing contracts appear to
be in answer to the original justification for the increased
contr. ting authority which was brought before the Senate
Armed Services Committee in 1983.
B. AMBIGUOUS MISSION
Underlying most of the problems experienced by Navy
Medicine is an ambiguous mission. The Medical Blue Ribbon
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Panel of 1988 made this point. On the one hand, the Medical
Blue Ribbon panel described the Navy Medical Department as
having two primary and complementary missions: (1) meet
operational and wartime medical requirements, and (2) deliver
peacetime health care to eligible beneficiaries. On the other
hand, the same report describes these "complementary missions"
as conflicting. (Department of the Navy, 1988)
The purpose of personal services contracts for direct
health care providers is captured in phrases such as
"facilitate mission accomplishment" and "maximize beneficiary
access". But with a medical mission whose objectives are
difficult to measure and without a clear definition of goals,
it is hard to quantify how any contract actions might
contribute to mission accomplishment. The phrase "maximize
beneficiary access" could be pursued literally forever.
Regardless of the resources provided to military medicine,
without limiting beneficiary access, or limiting what
procedures are covered, in some way, military medicine can
neveor fulfill such an unconstrained objective. (In fact
Melese [1990] has suggested this policy actually invites an
expansion of the dependant beneficiary base over time.)
C. WAGE CEILINGS
The data suggests that wage ceilings mandated by
legislation and DOD direction are apparently so easily
circumvented that one would argue that, in effect, they are
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not binding. On the other hand, an argument could be made
that the imposition of wage ceilings reduces the opportunity
to take advantage of competitive market conditions. If, for
instance, the market contains prospective contractors on
either side of the imposed wage ceiling, the contractors who
demand remuneration above the wage ceiling are not considered
for the contract. This effect reduces the number of
prospective contractors to those willing to work for a
compensation rate less than or equal to the maximum authorized
rate.
This condition is worsened by the government's
indemnification of the contractor. By not requiring
contractors to have their own liability insurance, the
government, in effect, is providing a non-wage compensation
equal to what the contractor would have had to spend on
liability insurance premiums. This additional compensation
favors the health care provider who bears the highest
liability insurance premiums, the health care provider at
highest risk of malpractice, the health care provider of
lesser quality (see the discussion in Chapter II). This leads
to an empirically testable hypothesis that the military, by
indemnifying the contractor, is more likely to obtain the
services of individuals who have a history of greater than
average liability insurance rates.
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D. APPARENT IMPROPRIETY IN CONTRACTING
It would seem presumptuous at best to declare any of the
ongoing personal services contracts for direct health care
providers improper without further study. The appearance of
impropriety, on the other hand, must be noted as a problem
with this type of contracting. One would argue that a major
rationale for price ceilings in these contracts is to prevent
the government from appearing improper in procurement of
services from a limited number of sources.
However, a number of questionable contracts appear among
the list contained in the appendices. Some of those contracts
have been mentioned in Chapter III, and some have not. For
instance, what justifies paying a pharmacist at the Naval
Medical Clinic at Port Hueneme, California $55,000.00 a year
to perform the services of a two tenths (0.2) full time
equivalent pharmacist? This equates to more than $1,000.00
per week for an eight hour visit each week. Perhaps the data
is incorrect.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter attempts to piece together some of the
obvious and a few of the not so obvious problems that have
arisen from the use of personal services contracts for direct
health care providers.
The chapter revisited the fact that relatively few of the
existing contracts seem to follow the original justification
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and touched upon a very large problem in militar- medicine,
the ambiguous and ill defined specification of the mission. 6
The problems surrounding price ceilings were found to play
less of a role in contributing to shortages than had
previously been thought. This is due primarily to the
apparent ease with which price ceilings are exceeded. The
price ceilings combined with waivers of malpractice liability,
might contribute to quality problems.7  Finally, the
appearance of impropriety in the contracting of certain
services was discussed.
'Melese (1990) provides a challenge to the traditional
views of military medicine's dual mission.
17Managers should note that shortages might be preferred
to quality problems, since shortages are non-transparent and
can be managed with reduced production, while quality problems




The original objective was the investigation of the
restrictive pricing policy used by the Department of Defense
in personal services contracts for direct health care
providers. Data, including a list of current Navy personal
services contracts, suggest that price ceilings imposed have
had little effect on the government's ability to contract for
most direct health care services. Two reasons explain this
apparent anomaly: (1) price ceilings are routinely exceeded
when no contractors are willing to offer services at a wage
equal to or less than the price ceiling; and (2) the majority
of existing contracts is for health care providers for whom
the ceiling price appears to exceed the market wage and thus
Department of Defense mandated restrictions for these
occupations are not binding.
There are a few contracts in which price restrictions may
have some effect on the iality of the contractor.
Contractors are not required to obtain their own liability
insurance, the government insures the contractor. This
results in a non-wage compensation to the contractor equal to
what he would have had to pay for liability insurance. A
larger benefit, and therefor greater overall compensation, is
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given to the contractor who would otherwise pay larger
malpractice premiums. This provides a relatively greater
incentive for the less reputable health care provider to seek
employment through a government contract.
A number of contracts deserve more in depth study. Some
of these have an appearance of impropriety or error in
reporting, some just seem very inefficient.
Finally the question of a more definitive mission
statement, one might argue, is still a question without an
answer. A mission statement starts with vision, values, and
expectations and is the most important element of the
organization (Digman, 1990). The Navy Medical Department
Mission warrants further discussion. As one alternative,
Melese (1990) offers an innovative, if non-traditional,
approach to military medicine which focuses on a "return to
'medical readiness,'" substituting direct income payments for
currently provided 'medical care' to dependents. This
approach would ultimately reduce the requirement for personal
services contracts for non-medical readiness physicians such
as OB/GYN and pediatricians.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Remove wage restrictions in personal services contracts,
but pay careful attention to competitive market wages. Market
wages in the health care industry are fairly easy to disclose
in most geographic regions, the competitive market wage should
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be used as a guide in contract pricing instead of wage
ceilings. Wage ceilings can have two negative impacts:
1) They can result in shortages of critical
occupations/specialties, and
2) They may reduce the quality of health care providers.
Finally, efforts to circumvent price restrictions may
lead to some impropriety in contracting. If personal services
are to be procured by contract, market forces must be
respected to ensure that the best qualified as well as best
priced contractors are employed.
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APPENDIX A CURRENT PERSONAL SERVICES CONTRACTS FOR DIRECT
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
Location Profession/Occupation FTE's Months Price
1 Barstow Optometrist II 0.1 12 $13,848
2 Bethesda Neuro Radiologist I 1 12 $259,770
3 Bethesda Dentist I 1 12 $42,660
4 Bethesda HIV Internist I 2 12 $223,255
5 Bethesda Radiologist I 1 12 $114,000
6 Bethesda Dentist I 1 12 $27,900
7 Bethesda Psychologist II 1 12 $42,849
8 Bethesda Pharmacist II 6 12 $337,334
9 Bethesda Nurses III 4.2 12 $294,248
0 Bethesda Nurses III 12.6 12 $882,745
1 Bethesda Nurses III 1.8 12 $123,940
12 Bethesda Nurses III 6 12 $420,547
13 Bethesda Nurses III 7 12 $489,100
14 Bethesda Nurses III 5.6 12 $392,331
15 Bethesda Nurses III 23 12 $1,596,652
16 Bethesda Nurses III 5.6 12 $392,331
17 Bethesda Nurses III 4 12 $279,469
18 Bethesda Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $40,000
19 Bethesda Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $39,000
20 Bethesda CAT Scan Techs IV 4 12 $168,300
21 Bethesda Respiratory Tech IV 7 12 $481,435
22 Bethesda Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,020
23 Bethesda Angiographer IV 1 12 $309,950
24 Bethesda Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $41,112
25 Bethesda X-Ray Techs IV 4 12 $94,000
26 Bremerton Dentist I 1 11 $50,000
27 Bremerton Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $36,000
28 Bremerton Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $44,784
29 Bremerton Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $44,784
30 Bremerton Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $45,108
31 Bremerton Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $46,020
32 Camp Pend Pharmacist II 1 12 $56,680
33 Camp Pend Speech Pathologist II 1 12 $38,400
34 Camp Pend Ultrasound Tech IV 1 5 $9,250
35 Camp Pend CAT Scan Techs IV 1 12 $21,250
36 Camp Pend CAT Scan Techs IV 1 3 $48,000
37 Charleston Dentist I 1 12 $47,549
38 Cp Lejeune GMO I 1 6 $29,120
39 Cp Lejeune Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $30,000
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Location Profession/Occupation FTE's Month Price
40 Groton GYN I 1 9 $52,754
41 Groton Pediatrician I 1 12 $71,923
42 Groton Pharmacist II 1 10 $35,891
43 Grt Lakes Dentist I 1 4 $13,829
44 Grt Lakes Dentist I 1 4 $13,600
45 Grt Lakes Dentist I 1 12 $42,068
46 Grt Lakes Dentist I 1 12 $41,400
47 Grt Lakes Dentist I 1 12 $41,834
48 Grt Lakes Dentist I 1 12 $43,956
49 Grt Lakes Dentist I 1 4 $13,996
50 Grt Lakes Dentist I 1 7 $40,488
51 Grt Lakes Dentist I 1 4 $13,996
52 Grt Lakes GMO I 0.5 12 $7,045
53 Grt Lakes Dentist 1 1 12 $43,992
54 Grt Lakes Dentist I 1 4 $13,833
55 Grt Lakes Dentist I 1 4 $14,000
56 Grt Lakes Dentist I 1 7 $41,364
57 Grt Lakes Dentist I 1 12 $41,834
58 Grt Lakes Nurse Practitioner II 1 12 $66,543
59 Grt Lakes Dental Hygienist IV 0.5 12 $22,714
60 Grt Lakes Dental Hygienist IV 0.5 12 $18,689
61 Grt Lakes Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $36,750
62 Grt Lakes Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,378
63 Grt Lakes Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $29,700
64 Grt Lakes Dental Hygienist IV 1 8 $32,305
65 Grt Lakes Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $35,640
66 Grt Lakes Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,378
67 Grt Lakes Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $35,400
68 Grt Lakes Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $33,280
69 Jacks Dentist I 2 12 $52,056
70 Jacks Dentist I 1 11 $45,303
71 Jacks Dentist 1 1 12 $50,457
72 Jacks Pharmacist II 1 12 $51,360
73 Jacks Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $35,400
74 Jacks Dental Hygienist IV 0.5 12 $18,000
75 Jacks Dental Hygienist IV 1 9 $27,600
76 Jacks Pharmacy Techs IV 1 12 $25,689
77 Long Beach Dentist i 1 12 $47,760
78 Long Beach Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $43,626
79 Long Beach Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $43,626
80 Millington Pathologist I 1 12 $242,000
81 Millington Psychologist I 1 12 $64,980
82 Newport Dentist I 1 7 $44,940
83 Newport Dentist I 1 8 $42,656
84 Newport Dentist I 1 8 $39,872
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Location Profession/Occupation FTE's Month Price
85 Newport Dentist I 1 11 $44,000
86 Newport Dental Hygienist IV 0.6 6 $6,116
87 Norfolk Dentist I 1 12 $43,200
88 Norfolk Dentist I 1 12 $38,500
89 Norfolk Dentist I 1 12 $39,996
90 Norfolk Dentist I 1 12 $42,996
91 Norfolk Dentist I 1 12 $41,000
92 Norfolk Dentist I 1 12 $41,000
93 Norfolk Dentist I 1 12 $35,200
94 Norfolk Dentist I 1 12 $45,088
95 Norfolk Dentist I 1 12 $35,244
96 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,200
97 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,200
98 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,200
99 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,200
100 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,200
101 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,200
102 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $36,900
103 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $33,804
104 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,200
105 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $29,500
106 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $36,400
107 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $29,400
108 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,200
109 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $32,400
110 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,200
11 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $30,000
112 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $34,500
113 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,200
114 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $36,000
115 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $36,000
116 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $34,500
117 Oakland Pharmacist II 3 12 $160,555
118 Oakland Nurses III 30 12 $2,905,736
119 Oakland Nurses III 31 12 $2,565,525
120 Oakland Nurses III 9 12 $687,657
121 Oakland Nurses III 58.8 12 $2,696,358
122 Oakland Nurses IIi 7 12 $531,596
123 Oakland Dental Hygienist IV 1 8 $28,320
124 Oakland Radiation Therapy IV 2 9 $67,307
125 Orlando OB/GYN I -3 12 $500,000
126 Orlando Dentist I 1 12 $50,400
127 Orlando Dentist I 1 7 $29,850
128 Orlando Dentist I 1 12 $42,000
129 Orlando Pathologist I 1 12 $229,480
130 Orlando Dentist I 1 12 $48,600
131 Orlando Dentist I 1 12 $48,000
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Location Profession/Occupation FTE's Months Price
132 Orlando Dentist I 1 12 $52,056
133 Orlando Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $36,000
134 Orlando Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $32,400
135 Orlando Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $34,908
136 Orlando Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,488
137 Orlando Dental Hygienist IV 1 8 $20,000
138 Orlando Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $34,500
139 Orlando Dental Hygienist IV 1 8 $18,000
140 Parris Is Dental Hygienist IV 1 7 $21,869
141 Parris Is Dental Hygienist IV 1 5 $14,958
142 Pensacola Dentist I 1 12 $46,428
143 Pensacola Dentist I 1 12 $42,636
144 Pensacola Dentist I 1 12 $50,606
145 Pensacola Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $36,000
146 Pensacola Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $30,900
147 Pensacola Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $25,980
148 Pensacola Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $31,240
149 Pensacola Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,488
150 Philly Dentist I 1 12 $43,936
151 Philly Dental Hygienist IV 0.5 12 $18,076
152 Philly Dental Hygienist IV 1 4 $12,668
153 Portsmouth Pharmacist II 4 12 $220,480
154 Portsmouth Pharmacist II 5 12 $245,600
155 Portsmouth Nurses III 1 12 $41,600
156 Portsmouth Nurses 1II 39 12 $585,000
157 Portsmouth Pharmacy Techs IV 15 6 $246,600
158 Portsmouth Pharmacy Techs IV 10 9 $221,520
159 Prt Hueneme Pharmacist II 0.2 12 $55,000
160 San Diego Dentist I 1 12 $12,821
161 San Diego Dentist I 1 4 $10,500
162 San Diego Dentist I 1 4 $10,395
163 San Diego Dentist I 1 12 $30,720
164 San Diego Physiologist I 1 5 $15,600
165 San Diego Dentist I 1 12 $32,804
166 San Diego Dentist I 1 5 $11,244
167 San Diego Dentist I 1 9 $31,500
168 San Diego Dentist I 1 12 $26,250
169 San Diego Dentist I 1 12 $44,000
170 San Diego Dentist I 1 9 $31,682
171 San Diego Dentist I 1 12 $34,500
172 San Diego Dentist I 0.5 3 $6,600
173 San Diego Dentist I 1 12 $32,381
174 San Diego Dentist I 1 12 $15,833
175 San Diego Dentist I 0.5 12 $12,688
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176 San Diego Dentist I 1 4 $13,305
177 San Diego Ped Endocrinologist I 0.5 12 $25,000
178 San Diego Dentist I 1 9 $9,496
179 San Diego Dentist I 0.5 12 $6,750
180 San Diego Dentist I 1 2 $12,910
181 San Diego Dentist I 1 9 $32,667
182 San Diego OB/GYN I 1 12 $73,500
183 San Diego Dentist I 1 1 $2,357
184 San Diego Dentist I 1 4 $14,242
185 San Diego OB/GYN I 1 12 $30,600
186 San Diego Perfusionist II 2 12 $100,000
187 San Diego Nurse Anesthetist II 1 12 $59,000
188 San Diego Pharmacist 1I 5 12 $245,000
189 San Diego Pediatric Nurse Pr II 1 12 $54,000
190 San Diego Nurse Anesthetist II 1 12 $57,200
191 San Diego Nurse Anesthetist Ii 1 12 $59,000
192 San Diego Nurses 1II 41 12 $1,400,000
193 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $43,626
194 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $43,626
195 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 4 $7,920
196 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $32,200
197 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $43,626
198 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $11,040
199 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 0.5 12 $18,096
200 San Diego Rad Oncology Tech IV 1 12 $47,500
201 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $33,580
202 San Diego Radiation Therapy IV 1 12 $51,000
203 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $43,626
204 San Diego Radiation Therapy IV 1 12 $51,000
205 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $43,626
206 San Diego Radiation Therapy IV 2 12 $104,180
207 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 5 $6,200
208 San Diego Ultrasound Tech IV 2 12 $118,976
209 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 0.5 12 $17,811
210 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 8 $13,440
211 San Diego Dental Hygienist Ir 1 12 $43,626
212 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $43,626
213 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $43,626
214 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $43,626
215 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $34,960
216 San Diego Physiological Tech IV 1 4.5 $7,650
217 San Fran Dentist I 1 12 $50,004
218 San Fran Dental Hygienist IV 1 8 $23,010
219 San Fran Dental Hygienist IV 1 8 $28,320
220 San Fran Dental Hygienist IV 1 8 $28,320
221 San Fran Dental Hygienist IV 1 8 $28,320
Total = $27,239,417
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APPENDIX B LIST OF PERSONAL SERVICES CONTRACTS BY
PROFESSION/OCCUPATION
Doctors
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48 San Diego Dentist I 0.5 12 $6,750.00 $6,362.08 $38,172.48 $31,422.48
49 San Diego Dentist I 1 12 $15,833.00 $6,362.08 $76,344.96 $60,511.96
50 San Diego Dentist I 0.5 12 $12,688.00 $6,362.08 $38,172.48 $25,484.48
51 San Diego Dentist 2 1 12 $26,250.00 $6,362.08 $76,344.96 $50,094.96
52 San Diego Dentist I 1 5 $11,244.00 $6,362.08 $31,810.40 $20,566.40
53 San Diego Dentist I 1 1 $2,357.00 $6,362.08 $6,362.08 $4,005.08
54 San Diego Dentist I 1 12 $:',720.00 $6,362.08 $76,344.96 $45,624.96
55 San Diego Dentist I 1 4 I0,395.00 $6,362.08 $25,448.32 $15,053.32
56 San Diego Dentist I 1 4 $10,500.00 $6,362.)8 $25,448.32 $14,948.32
57 San Diego Dentist T 1 2 $32,381.00 $6,362.08 $76,344.96 $43,963.96
58 San Diego Dentist 1 12 $32,804.00 $6,362.08 $76,344.96 $43,540.96
59 San Diego Dentist 1 1 12 $34,500.00 $6,362.08 $76,344.96 $41,844.96
60 San Diego Dentist I 1 4 $13,305.00 $6,361.08 $25,448.32 $12,143.32
61 San Diego Dent!st I 1 9 $31,500.00 $6,362.08 $57,258.72 $25,758.72
62 San Diego Dentist I 1 9 $31,682.00 $6,362.08 $57,258.72 $25, 576.72
63 San Diego Dentist I 1 4 $14,242.00 $6,362.08 $25,448.32 $11,206.32
64 San Diego Dentist I 1 9 $32,667.00 $6,362.08 $57,258.72 $24,591.72
65 San Diego Dentist 1 1 12 $44,000.00 $6,362.08 $76,344.96 $32,344.96
66 San Diego Dentist I 0.5 3 $6,600.00 $6,362.08 $9,543.12 $2,943.12
Lc'c*atin Profession/Occupation FTE's Months Price Auth/Month Total Auth Difference
67 San Diego Dentist I 1 2 $12,910.00 $6,362.08 $12,724.16 ($185.84)
68 San Fran Dentist i 1 12 $50,004.00 $6,426.36 $77,116.32 $27,112.32
Total- - 67.5 656 $2,257,728.00 $422,ji0.41 $4,046,389.63 $1,788,661.63
Weig:f d average - $3,449.55 $6,210.45 $6,182.41 $2,732.87
Other P. fesionals
Lc-atiin Prefession/Occupation FTE's Months Price Auth/Month Total Auth Difference
I Barstow Optometrist 11 0.1 12 $13,848.00 $4,857.78 $5,829.34 ($8,0:.8.66)
2 Bethesda Pharmacist II 6 12 $337,334.00 $5,156.44 $371,263.68 $33,929.68
3 Bethesda Psychologist II 1 12 $42,849.00 $5,156.44 $61,877.28 $19,028.28
4 Camp Pend Pharmacist Ii 1 12 $56,680.00 $5,116.37 $61,396.44 $4,716.44
5 Camp Pend Speech Pathologi4t II 1 12 $38,400.00 $5,116.37 $61,396.44 $22,996.44
6 Groton Pharmacist II 1 10 $35,891.00 $5,336.65 $53,366.50 $17,475.50
7 Grt Lakes Nurse Practitioner II 1 12 $66,543.00 $5,282.63 $63,391.56 ($3,151.44)
8 Jacks Pharmacist II 1 12 $51,360.00 $4,989.32 $59,871.84 $8,511.84
9 Oakland Pharmacist 1I 3 12 $160,555.00 $5,282.63 $190,174.68 $29,619.68
10 Fortsmouth Pharmacist 1: 5 12 $245,600.00 $4,942.59 $296,555.40 $50,955.40
11 Portsmouth Pharmacist II 4 12 $220,480.00 $4,942.59 $237,244.32 $16,764.32
il Prt Hueneme Pharmacist II 0.2 12 355,000.00 $5,225.82 $12,541.97 ($42,458.03)
1-3 San Diego Nurse Anesthetist II 1 12 $57,200 00 $5,253.44 $63,041.28 $5,841.28
14 San Diego Nurse Anesthetist II 1 12 $59,000.00 $5,253.44 $63,041.28 $4,041.28
15 San Diego Nurse Anesthetist II 1 12 $59,000.00 $5,253.44 $63,041.28 $4,041.28
16 San Diego Pediatric Nurse Pr II i 12 $54,000.00 $5,253.44 $63,041.28 $9,041.28
17 San Diego Perfusionlst 11 2 12 $100,000.00 $5,253.44 $126,082.56 $26,082.56
18 San Diego Pharmacist II 5 12 $245,000.00 $5,253.44 $315,206.40 $70,206.40
Totals 35.3 214 $1,898,740.00 $92,926.27 $2,168,363.32 $269,623.52
Weighted average - S4,083.23 $5,162.57 $5,25.44 $1,170.11
Registered Nur.%s
L--ation Profosslon/Occupation FTE's Months Price Auth/Month Total Auth - Difference
1 Betheda Iturres III 1.8 12 5123,940.00 $4,427.24 $95,628.38 ($28,311.62)
2 Bethesda Nurses II 4 12 $279,469.00 $4,427.24 $212,507.52 ($66,961.48)
3 Bethesda Hursas III 4.2 12 $294,248.00 $4,427.24 $223,132.90 ($71,115.10)
4 Bethcsda Nurses III 5.6 12 $392,331.00 $4,427.24 $297,6!0.53 ($94,820.47)
5 Bethesda t'irses III 5.6 12 $392,331.00 $4,427.24 $297,510.53 ($94,820.47)
6 Bethesda Nurses II 6 12 $420,547.00 $4.427.24 $318,761.28 ($101,785.72)
7 8etho3da Nurses III 7 L2 $489,100.00 $4,427.24 $371,888.16 ($117,211.84)
8 Bethesda Nur3es III 12.6 12 $(82,74S.00 $4,427.24 $669,398.69 ($213,346.31)
9 BethqsdA Nurses III 23 12 $1,596,652.00 $4,427.24 $.221,918.24 ($374,733.76)
Loc~tion Profcassio,/Occupation FTE's Months Price Auth/MKnth Total Auth Difference
It, Oakland Nurses III 7 12 $t31,596.00 $4,518.55 $379,558.20 ($152,037.80)
11 Oakland Nirses 11 9 12 $687.657.00 $4,518.55 $488,003.40 ($.99,653.60)
12 Oakland Nurses III 30 12 $2,905,736.00 $4,518.55 $1,626,678.00 ($1,279,058.00)
13 Oakland Nurses II 31 12 $2,565,525.00 $4,518.55 $1,680,900.60 ($884,624.40)
14 Oakland Nurses III 58.8 12 $2,696,358.00 $4,51855 $3,188,288.88 $491,930.88
15 PortsmoIth Nurses III 1 12 $41,600.00 $4,239.26 $50,871.36 $9,271.36
16 Portsmouth N;urses 11 39 12 S58b,000.00 $4,239.28 $1,983,983.04 $1,398,983.04
17 San Diego Nurses II 41 12 $1,400,000.00 $4,457.24 $2,192,962.08 $792,962.08
Tota1 286.6 204 416,284i835.00 $75,373.71 $15,299,501.78 ($985,333.22)
Waighted average $4,735.06 $4,433.75 $4,448.56 ($286.50)
60
Paraprofessionals
Location Profession/occupation FTE1' Aorths Price Auth/Month Total Auth Differen-e
1 Bethesda Angiographer IV 1 12 $30S,950.00 $3,494.04 $41,928.48 ($268,021.52)
3 Bethesda CT Techa IV 4 12 $168,300.00 $3,494.04 $167,713.92 ($586.08)
2 Bethesda Resp Tech IV 7 12 $481,435.00 $3,494.04 $293,499.36 ($187,935.64)
4 Bethesda X-Ray Techs IV 4 12 $94,000.00 $3,494.04 $167,713.92 $73,713.92
5 Camp Pend CAT Tech IV 1 3 $48,000.00 $3,442.62 $10,327.86 ($37,672.14)
6 Camp Pend CAT Tech IV 1 12 $21,250.00 $3,442.62 $41,311.44 $20,061.44
7 Camp Pend US Tech IV 1 5 $2,250.00 $3,442.62 $17,213.10 $7,963.10
8 Jacks Pharm Tech IV 1 12 $25,689.00 $3,317.06 $39,804.72 $14,115.72
9 Oakland Rad Therapist IV 2 9 $67,307.00 $3,539.94 $63,718.92 ($3,588.08)
10 Portsmouth Pharm Techa IV 10 9 $221,520.00 $3,330.12 $299,710.80 $78,190.80
13 Portsmouth Pharm Techs IV 15 6 $246,600.00 $3,330.12 $299,710.80 $53,110.80
12 San Diego Physiology Tech IV 1 4.5 $7,650.00 $3,485.34 $15,684.03 $8,034.03
11 San Diego Rad Oncology Tech IV 1 12 $47,500.00 $3,485.34 $41,824.08 ($5,675.92)
14 San Diego Rad Therapy Tech IV 1 12 $51,000.00 $3,485.34 $41,824.08 ($9,175.92)
15 San Diego Rad Therapy Tech IV 2 12 $104,180.00 S3,485.34 $83,648.16 ($20,531.84)
16 San Diego Rad Therapy Tech IV 1 12 $51,000.00 $3,485.34 $41,824.08 ($9,175.92)
17 San Diego US Tech IV 2 12 $118,976.00 $3,485.34 $83,648.16 ($35,327.84)
Totals - 55 168.5 $2,073,607.00 $58,733.30 $1,751,105.91 ($322,501.09)
Weighted average - $4,061.91 $3,454.90 $3,430.18 ($631.74)
Dental Hygienists
Location Profession/Occupation FTE's Months Price Auth/Month T tal Auth Difference
1 Bethesda Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,020.00 $3,494.04 $41,928.48 $4,908.48
2 Bethesda Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $41,112.00 $3,494.04 $41,928.48 $816.48
3 Bethesda Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $40,000.00 $3,494.04 $41,928.48 $1,928.48
4 Bethesda Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $39,000.00 $3,494.04 $41,928.48 $2,928.48
Location Profession/Occupation FTI's Months Price Auth/Month Total Auth Difference
5 Bremerton Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $36,000.00 $3,485.34 $41,824.08 $5,824.08
6 Bremerton Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $44,784.00 $3,485.34 $41,824.08 ($2,959.92)
7 Bremerton Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $46,020.00 $3,485.34 $41,824.08 ($4,195.92)
8 Bremerton Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $44,784.00 $3,485.34 $41,824.08 ($2,959.92)
9 Bremerton Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $45,108.00 $3,485.34 $41,824.08 ($3,283.92)
10 Cp Lejeu-a Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $30,000.00 $3,176.74 $38,120.88 $8,120.88
11 Grt Lakes Dental Hygienist IV 0.5 *2 $18,689.00 $3,539.94 $21,239.64 $2,550.64
12 Grt Lakes Dental Hygienist IV 0.5 12 $22,714.00 $3,539.94 $21,239.64 ($1,474.36)
13 Grt Lakes Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,378.00 $3,539.94 $42,479.28 $5,101.28
14 Grt Lakes Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $35,400.00 $3,539.94 $42,479.28 $7,079.28
15 Grt Lakes Dental Hygienist IV 1 8 $32,305.00 $3,539.94 $28,319.52 ($3,985.48)
16 Grt Lakes Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $29,700.00 $3,539.94 $42,479.28 $12,779.28
17 Grt Lakes Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,378.00 $3,539.94 $42,479.28 $5,101.28
18 Grt Lakes Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $35,640.00 $3,539.94 $42,479.28 $6,839.2e19 Grt Lakes Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $33,280.00 $3,539.94 $42,479.28 $9,199.28
k0 Grt Lakes Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $36,750.00 $3,539.94 $42,479.28 $5,729.28
21 Jacks Dental Hygienist IV 1).5 12 $18,000.00 $3,317.06 $19,902.36 $1,902.36
22 Jacks Dental Hygienist IV 1 9 $27,600.00 $3,317.06 $29,853.54 $2,253.54
23 Jacks Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $35,400.00 $3,317.06 $39,804.72 $4,404.72
24 Long Beach Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $43,626.00 $3,561.70 $42,740.40 ($885.60)
25 Long Beach Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $43,626.00 $3,561.70 $42,740.40 ($885.60)
26 Newport Dental Hygienist IV 0.6 6 $6,116.00 $3,234.64 $11,644.70 $5,528.70
27 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $36,400.00 $3,330.12 $39,961.44 $3,561.44
28 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,200.00 $3,330.12 $39,961.44 $2,761.44
29 Norfolk Dantal Hygienist zV 1 12 $36,000.00 $3,330.12 $39,961.44 $3,961.44
30 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,200.00 $3,330.12 $39,961.44 $2,761.44
31 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,200.00 $3,330.12 $39,961.41 $2,761.44
32 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,200.00 $3,330.12 $39,961.44 $2,761.44
33 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $36,000.00 $3,330.12 $39,961.44 $3,961.44
34 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,200.00 $3,330.12 $39,961.44 $2,761.44
35 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $36,900.00 $3,330.12 $39,961.44 $3,061.44
36 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $34,500.00 $3,330.12 $39,961.44 $5,461.44
37 Nrfolk. Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $29,400.00 $3,330.12 $39,961.44 $10,561.44
38 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,200.00 $3,330.12 $39,961.44 $2,761.44
39 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,200.00 $3,330.12 $39,961.44 $2,761.44
40 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $33,804.00 $3,330.12 $39,961.44 $6,157.44
41 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,200.00 $3,330.12 $39,961.44 $2,761.44
42 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,200.00 $3,330.12 $39,961.44 $2,761.44
43 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $32,400.00 $3,330.12 $39,961.44 $7,561.44
44 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $30,000.00 $3,330.12 $39,961.44 $9,96L.44
45 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,200.00 $3,330.12 $39,961.44 $2,761.44
46 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $29,500.00 $3,330.12 $39,961.44 $10,461.44
47 Norfolk Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $34,500.00 $3,130.12 $39,961.44 $5,461.44
48 Oakland Dental Hygienist IV 1 8 $28,320.00 S3,539,94 $28,319.52 ($0.48)
49 Orlando Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $32;400.00 $3,237.95 $38,855.40 $6,455.40
50 Orlando Dental Hygienist IV 1 8 $20,000.00 $3,237.95 $25,903.60 $5,903.60
51 Orlando Dental Hygienist IV 1 8 $18,000.00 $3,237.95 $28,903.60 $7,903.60
52 Orlando Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,488.00 $3,237.95 $38,855.40 $1,367.40
53 Orlando Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $34,908.00 $3,237.95 $38,855.40 $3,947.40
Location Profession/Ocupati.n FTE's M-nths Price Auth/Month Total Auth Difference
54 Otlando Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $34,500.00 $3,237.95 $38,855.40 $4,355.40
55 Orlando Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $36,000.00 $3,237.95 $38,855.40 $2,855.40
56 Parris Is Dental Hygienist IV 1 5 $14,958.00 $3,330.12 $16,650.60 $1,692.60
57 Parris Is Dental Hygienist IV 1 7 $21,869.00 $3,330.12 $23,310.84 $1,441.84
58 Pensacola Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $25,980.00 $3,202.89 $38,434.68 $12,454.68
59 Pensacola Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $36,000.00 $3,202.89 $38,434.68 $2,434.68
60 Pensacola Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $37,488.00 $3,202.89 $38,434.68 $946.68
61 Pensacola Dental Hyyieniet IV 1 12 $30,900.00 $3,202.89 $38,434.68 $7,534.68
62 Pensacola Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $31,240.00 $3,202.89 $38,434.68 $7,194.68
63 Philly Dental Hygienist IV 0.5 12 $18,076.00 $3,442.62 $20,655.72 $2,579.72
64 Philly Dental Hygienist IV 1 4 $12,668.00 $3,442.62 $13,770.48 $1,102.48
65 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 0.5 12 $18,096.00 $3,485.34 $20,912.04 $2,816.04
66 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 0.5 12 $17,811.00 $3,485.34 $20,912.04 $3,101.04
67 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $32,200.00 $3,485.34 $41,824.08 $9,624.08
68 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $43,626.00 $3,485.34 $41,824.08 ($1,801.92)
69 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $43,626.00 $3,485.34 $41,824.08 ($1,801.92)
70 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 5 $6,200.00 $3,485.34 $17,426.70 $11,226.70
71 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $33,580.00 $3,485.34 $41,P24.08 $8,244.08
72 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 4 $7,920.00 $3,485.34 $13,941.36 $6,021.36
73 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $43,626.00 $3,485.34 $41,824.08 ($1,801.92)
74 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $43,626.00 $3,485.34 $41,824.08 ($1,801.92)
75 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $11,040.00 $3,485.34 $41,824.08 $30,784.08
76 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $43,626.00 $3,485.34 $41,824.08 ($1,801.92)
77 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $34,960.00 $3,485.34 $41,824.08 $6,864.08
78 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $43,626.00 $3,485.34 $41,824.08 ($1,801.92)
79 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $43,626.00 $3,485.34 $41,824.08 ($1,801.92)
80 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $43,626.00 $3,485.34 $41,824.08 ($1,801.92)
81 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 8 $13,440.00 $3,485.34 $27,882.72 $14,442.72
82 San Diego Dental Hygienist IV 1 12 $43,626.00 $3,485.34 $41,824.08 ($1,801.92)
83 San Fran Dental Hygienist IV 1 8 $28,320.00 $3,680.38 $29,443.04 $1,123.04
84 San Fran Dental Hygienist IV 1 8 $28,320.00 $3,680.38 $29,443.04 $1,123.04
85 San Fran Dental Hygienist IV 1 8 $28,320.00 $3,680.38 $29,443.04 $1,123.04
86 San Fran Dental Hygienist IV 1 8 $23,010.00 $3,680.38 $29,443.04 $6,433.04
Totals - 82.6 952 $2,785,480.00 $293,443.90 $3,112,510.14 $327,030.14
Weighted average - $3,048.91 $3,412.14 $3,406.86 $357.96
Overall Totals - 544 $27,239,417.00 $1,035,796.32 $27,536,800.35 $297,383.35
Weighted average $4,445.51 $4,686.86 $4,494.04 $48.53
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